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Abstract—In this paper, we propose Device Authentication
Code (DAC), a novel method for authenticating IoT devices
with wireless interface by exploiting their radio frequency (RF)
signatures. The proposed DAC is based on RF fingerprinting,
information theoretic method, feature learning, and discrimi-
natory power of deep learning. Specifically, an autoencoder is
used to automatically extract features from the RF traces, and
the reconstruction error is used as the DAC and this DAC is
unique to the device and the particular message of interest. Then
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test is used to match the distribution
of the reconstruction error generated by the autoencoder and
the received message, and the result will determine whether the
device of interest belongs to an authorized user. We validate
this concept on two experimentally collected RF traces from
six ZigBee and five universal software defined radio peripheral
(USRP) devices, respectively. The traces span a range of Signal-
to-Noise Ratio by varying locations and mobility of the devices
and channel interference and noise to ensure robustness of the
model. Experimental results demonstrate that DAC is able to
prevent device impersonation by extracting salient features that
are unique to any wireless device of interest and can be used to
identify RF devices. Furthermore, the proposed method does not
need the RF traces of the intruder during model training yet be
able to identify devices not seen during training, which makes it
practical.
Index Terms—RF fingerprinting, Deep Learning, Internet of
Things, autoencoder, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test.
I. INTRODUCTION
We introduce a novel method for authenticating IoT devices
with wireless interfaces based on their radio frequency (RF)
signatures called the Device Authentication Code (DAC). DAC
exploits the potential of RF fingerprinting and the feature
learning power of autoencoders. DAC similar to the message
authentication code (MAC) approach to message authentica-
tion in cryptographic network security applications. With the
DAC any IoT device with a wireless interface that transmits
a wireless can be authenticated and the integrity of the trans-
mitted signal verified because the method exploits the features
inherent to the device alone that uniquely distinguishes that
device from any other device.
The process of device authentication using the DAC scheme
is depicted in Figure 1, an AE is trained to reconstruct the
inputs given to it by minimizing the reconstruction error.
This reconstruction error is used as the device authentication
code (DAC). A device passes the signal to be transmitted
through a pretrained auto-encoder (AE) based model. The
signal is concatenated with the reconstruction (DAC) and
transmitted. At the receiver, the received signal is decoupled
into the original signal and DAC. The signal is then passed
through the AE model deployed at the receiver to generate
another DAC. Device authentication is done by comparing the
two DAC using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. An exact
match in both DAC authenticates the transmitting device. If
confidentiality is required, the encoded version of the signal
could be transmitted instead of the raw signal.
The identification of IoT devices based on the physical
characteristics of their built-in components is applicable not
just for authentication but also for tracking both the device and
its user [1]. The fingerprints are typically created during the
manufacturing process as the base materials of the components
are created. Creation of fingerprints are usually accidental or
inherent to the process. However, it is possible to generate and
insert them on purpose. In either case, the RF fingerprints are
a result of minute variations in the electronic components [1].
When appropriately analyzed, RF fingerprints can be exploited
to identify and distinguish one device from another, even
from the same manufacturer model [1]. Unlike RF features,
identifiers at other layers such as MAC addresses and Inter-
national Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) are relatively easy
to impersonate [2], [3].
In our previous work [4], we proposed an intrusion detection
model pipeline based on RF fingerprinting combining deep
learning, dimension reduction and clustering models. After
training, the model pipeline clusters the RF traces from
authorized devices into separate clusters, corresponding to
each authorized device. When RF traces from an unauthorized
device goes through the pipeline, it is clustered as a new
cluster (the intruder). This framework can the detect presence
of an intruder by determining the amount of unique clusters
(devices) in the perimeter of interest. However, this model
cannot ascertain which RF trace belongs to an intruder. The
DAC is a more holistic and robust approach that mitigates this
limitation.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following manner:
In Section II, we present background on components from
which the inspiration of our work is drawn. An explanation
of the proposed approach is given in Section III. In Section
IV information on experiments including data collection and
analysis of results are presented. Related work are presented
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Fig. 1: Authentication and Confidentiality using Device Authentication Code
in Section V and Section VI contains conclusions and future
works.
II. BACKGROUND
Device identification via RF fingerprinting typically in-
volves data collection, processing, feature extraction and de-
vice identification. In this work we apply deep learning to
automate these tasks. This is because its success in feature
learning, and classification accuracy across multiple domains
such as computer vision, speech, natural language and signal
processing. However, in supervised deep learning samples and
labels from all classes of interest must be present during
training. During inference, a test sample from a class not
observed during training will be classified as one of the already
seen classes. For this reason we adopt unsupervised learning.
Message authentication comprises methods used to verify
the identity of the sender and/or the integrity of the mes-
sage (meaning it has not been modified, deleted or is being
replayed). Traditionally, the main methods for performing
authentication are: message encryption, the use of message
authentication codes (MAC) and hash functions. In this section
we briefly introduce the MAC approach.
A. Message Authentication Code (MAC)
Consider sending a message M between two parties A and B
that share a secret key K. To transmit a message to B, A uses K
to create a message authentication code (MACS), a fixed sized
cryptographic checksum and function MAC = C(K,M) of
the message and the shared key. The MAC is appended to the
message and transmitted. B applies the MAC function on the
message and generates a new MACR using the secret key.
The newly generated MACR is compared with the received
MACS . If MACS =MACR, then:
1) B is assured that M has not been altered because if
an intruder modifies M without modifying MACS ,
then MACR will not match MACS . Also, the intruder
cannot modify MACS to reflect changes in the message
because he does not have K.
2) B is also assured that the message came from A because
only A has K required to generate a message with the
correct MAC.
The above scheme describes the approach to authentication.
There is no confidentiality because anyone can have access to
M . Traditionally, confidentiality is introduced by encrypting
M either before or after the MAC procedure. The later is the
popular choice. However both parties need two set of keys.
B. Autoencoders
Autoencoders (AE) are neural networks with the objective
of reconstructing data input into them (Figure 2). Mathemati-
cally, the autoencoder attempts to learn the identity function:
fW,b(x) = x (1)
by minimizing the “reconstruction error” between the input
and its reconstruction given as:
L(x, x
′
) = ||x− x′ ||2 (2)
First the AE learns an “encoded” representation of the data,
by extracting the inherent structure in the data [5]. Learning
the encoded representation can be achieved by restricting the
number of nodes in the encoding layers as in undercomplete
autoencoders [6]. Overcomplete autoencoders learn structure
by imposing other regularization constraints on the encoding
layer such as sparsity as in sparse autoencoders [7], or addition
of noise as in denoising autoencoders [8].
Convolutional autoencoders (CAE) exploit spatial relation-
ships in data by weight sharing [9]. AEs can be extended to
Fig. 2: Architecture of an Autoencoder
Fig. 3: Reconstruction error for six identical RF devices
transmitting identical signals
make deeper networks and can be trained in a greedy layer-
wise manner, where each layer is the latent representation of
an already trained AE.
C. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test
The K-S test is a non-parametric test used to ascertain
whether a sample comes from a population whose distribution
is known, or whether the distribution of two populations are
the same. In the one-sample test, a one-dimensional probability
distribution is compared to a reference probability distribution.
In the two-sample test two samples from two distributions
are compared. If we define the empirical distribution function
(EDF) Fn for n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
observations Xi which are ordered as:
Fn(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
I[−∞,x](Xi) (3)
where I[−∞,x](Xi) is an indicator function equals 1 when
Xi ≤ x and 0 otherwise. Then the K-S statistic for another
EDF F (x) is:
Dn = sup
x
|Fn(x)− F (x)| (4)
where supx is the supremum function of the set of distances.
The K-S statistic converges to 0 as n goes to infinity if the
sample is from the distribution F (x). Analogously, for the
two-sample test , given two empirical distributions F1,n and
F2,m with sample sizes of n and m, respectively, the K-S
statistic for the first and second sample is
Dn,m = sup
x
|F1,n(x)− F2,m(x)| (5)
Given a specified level α, the null hypothesis can be rejected
for large sample sizes if
Dn,m > c(α)
√
n+m
nm
(6)
where in general
c(α) =
√
−1
2
lnα (7)
It is possible to set confidence limits on F (x) such that
for the test statistic Dα, if P (Dn > Dα) = α then F (x)
will be contained in Fn(x) and a tolerance of width ±Dα
with a probability of 1 - α. The null hypothesis is that both
samples are drawn from the same distribution and the p-
value is a measure of similarity. If the p-value is “small”, the
null hypothesis should be rejected. The KS-test measures the
distance between the empirical distribution functions of both
samples without any assumptions about the distribution of the
data. Unlike the t-test, K-S test is robust to scale changes and
it is not restricted to identifying changes only in the mean.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION - DEVICE AUTHENTICATION
CODES (DAC)
A. Problem Statement
We herein restate the problem for the purpose of emphasis.
There are n RF devices with wireless interfaces. All devices
are of the same make and model and are considered iden-
tical (figure 4). All devices are made to transmit the same
information. This procedure is repeated but at different noise
levels. One of the devices is considered an intruder. Another
constraint is that the RF traces from the intruder device are
not available for the training of the model. The objective is to
authenticate any device of interest and identify the intruder.
B. Mathematical formulation
We represent the manufacturing process for a batch of RF
devices such as sensors as:
S = So + µM (8)
So represents the features common to every device in the
batch and is required for any device to pass quality control.
Fig. 4: Problem Scenario
µM accounts for minor differences and uncertainties due to the
imperfection of the manufacturing process. An autoencoder as
a function:
X → Z → Xˆ (9)
is a mapping that encodes an input X to a latent representation
Z, and decodes Z to recover X . Since there is no explicit
formula for Xˆ , what has been done instead is to minimize:
min||X − Xˆ||2 (10)
during training using data. In wireless communications there
are also environmental factors ε, such as channel fading,
thermal noise, and effects of device mobility, that are superim-
posed on the received signal. Therefore the training data can
be denoted as:
X = f(S, ε), (11)
which is a mapping generated by the underlying stochastic
process that consists of S which contains the manufacturing
uncertainty µM , and ε which contains environmental uncer-
tainty. Based on the premise of RF fingerprinting, µM is
unique to every RF device. Hence, for a batch of devices:
Si = S0 + µMi i = 1, ...N. (12)
it is possible to identify Si ∀i ∈ N using a method that is
robust to the environmental uncertainty ε that affects the data
X obtained from the batch of devices. We show experimentally
that this can be achieved using an autoencoder and a two-sided
K-S test.
C. Intrusion Detection with Autoencoder and K-S test
Autoencoder based models have been used for anomaly and
novelty detection in other domains [11], [12]. Autoencoders
were used to detect abnormalities in machines by detecting
abnormal operation sounds [13], and to detect anomalies in
video frames [14]. The idea is based on the fact that a trained
autoencoders will produce a low reconstruction error for data
from the same or similar distribution as the training data but a
high reconstruction error otherwise. Hence the reconstruction
error is thresholded and used to identify anomaly.
However, for our specific problem of interest, the devices
are of the same make and model, and may transmit identical
signals (see Figure 6). In this case, the threshold approach
does not work. Figure 3 shows the reconstruction error during
inference for a CAE trained on five out of six devices with RF
traces from one device left out. It is obvious that identifying
a novel device (say, any one of the six devices not used in
training) with a single threshold will not suffice. Instead we
require a metric that can capture and differentiate between
distributions.
Figure 5 depicts the DAC process. An autoencoder is trained
on the RF traces from authorized devices. During inference,
the distribution of the mean square error (MSE) between
signals and their reconstructions will be unique to each device.
This holds true for devices of the same make and model, and
transmitting identical signals. The MSE are analogous to a
fingerprint, and we use them as the DAC in this study.
For an application such as device registration on a network,
the weights of the trained AE is deployed in each authorized
device as the secret key. Every device will be required to
transmit a predetermined signal upon start-up. The start-up
signal is concatenated with its DAC before transmission. A
similar setup applies for message authentication for intrusion
detection except that any signal can be transmitted by a
registered device. The receiving device decodes the signal and
reconstructs the original signal using its own key. The DAC
is compared to the DAC received from the sending device. A
match (i.e., a K-S statistic of 0 and p-value of 1) means that
the device is an authorized (pre-registered) device, otherwise
the device is flagged as a new device (possibly an intruder).
In the device registration scenario, even if an intruder knows
the signal being transmitted and attempt to use a device of
the same make and model to transmit an identical signal, his
DAC will not be a match at the receiver because the intruder
does not have the exact same AE weighs (key). Furthermore,
if the message to be transmitted requires confidentiality, the
encoded form of the message obtained from the encoder of the
autoencoder can be transmitted instead of the original signal.
This adds confidentiality and another layer of security. This
approach is very secure because the probability of obtaining
the exact set of network weights as installed in the device is
very low.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental setup
1) Data Collection: RF traces were collected from two
types of devices: (1) six MICAz-MPR2400 sensors, with IEEE
802.15.4 compliant ZigBee ready transceiver operating in [2.4,
2.8] GHz range. (2) NI USRP-293x Software Defined Radio
(SDR) Devices. An NI USRP-293x configured in receiver
mode using LabVIEW was used to capture the RF traces. All
ZigBee devices were configured to transmit at 0, -1, -5, -10,
-15dBm SNR, and the USRPs to transmit at [-10dB, 10dB] in
steps of 2dB. This is done to simulate a real life scenario which
Fig. 5: Training and Inference using DAC
encompasses the effect of degradation and distance, varying
channel conditions, noise and device mobility on the signal
strength. Transmission were made with the devices mobile as
well as stationary.
RF traces from one of the devices are not used for training
the model (figure 4). The RF traces consist In-phase (I) and
Quadrature (Q) vectors. A sample of the identical RF traces
obtained from the ZigBee devices is shown in figure 6.
2) Training and Authentication: The raw RF traces from
the authorized devices is used to train the AE-based model.
The model performs automated feature extraction and dimen-
sion reduction on the data and during inference, a K-S test
is performed on any RF trace to ascertain if it is from an
authorized device.
The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated on
the generated datasets. As previously stated, one device is
considered the intruder and left out of training. 90% of the
IQ samples from the other authorized devices at varying SNR
levels are used for training, half of the remaining 10% are
used for validation and the remaining 5% of samples are mixed
with IQ samples from the intruder class for testing. It is worth
mentioning again that the data are collected for each device at
different SNR levels and combined in order to mimic multipath
effects, variation in channel conditions as well as noise.
B. Results and Analysis
Table I shows the KS statistic and p-values when comparing
the DAC of the raw RF traces of all devices. We can consider
the rows and columns to represent the sending and receiving
devices respectively. For example in row one, the DAC for
RF traces from device 0 is compared with DAC computed
at the receiver on the RF traces obtained from every device
including device 0 itself. The same is done every RF device
of interest. The first and second element of the tuple in every
cell of the table is the K-S statistic and p-value of the K-S test
Fig. 6: Sample of RF I and Q data captured from all ZigBee
devices
respectively. As previously mentioned, the null hypothesis is
that both samples are from the same distribution.
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected if either the statistic
is very low, or the p-value is high. Typical values considered
as low are in the range [0, 0.1]. On the other hand, the null
hypothesis should be rejected if the K-S statistic is high and
the p-value is very low. In other words, a K-S statistic in the
range [0, 0.1] and p-value in the range [0.9, 1.0] indicates that
the device of interest is an authorized device. On the other
hand, for a K-S statistic of greater than 0.1 and p-value less
than 0.9 indicate that the DAC is from a different distribution
and the device of interest is not authorized.
The values of interest in Table I are highlighted in bold. The
first thing to observe is that every cell in the diagonal of the
table contains (0.00, 1.00). This indicates a perfect match and
it is intuitive since the RF trace is from the authorized device.
Secondly for every other cell, the first element of every tuple
are very small values. This shows that the raw RF traces from
all the devices according to the K-S test are considered almost
identical. Hence the performance of the DAC approach will
be based on how far away from zero the K-S statistic is or
how close to one the p-value is. Only an authorized device
will have the values (0.00, 1.00) signifying a DAC match.
Table II show a similar comparison done in Table I but on
the DAC obtained for every device using our approach. It can
be observed that the values for the K-S statistic here is much
higher than in table ?? for the raw RF traces. In fact only one
comparison has a K-S statistic of approximately 0.2. If we con-
sider 0.1 to be the minimum threshold below which we cannot
reject the null hypothesis, then the CAE model performs quite
well and is able to produce very discriminatory features, even
though the original data (RF traces) are identical.
Tables III and IV show the performance of the CAE model
trained on ZigBee and USRP RF traces respectively collected
at single noise levels as well as on RF traces from all noise
levels mixed together. The device of interest is device 5 and 2
for the ZigBee and USRP devices respectively. As expected,
the model performs better when tested at single noise levels
especially for the ZigBee devices. However the model still
performs very well on data containing RF traces from all
noise levels. This is important because in real life scenario,
the wireless signals will seldom be at one noise level due to
environmental factors. Hence it is important that the model is
robust to these different phenomena.
In summary, it is evident that DAC approach is successful
at exploiting device inherent features. In an authentication
scenario, if the K-S statistic and the p-value between the DAC
of the data received by a sending device, and that of the
reconstruction error produced by receiving device are 0 and 1
respectively, then that device is an authorized device. Other-
wise that device can be flagged as an intruder. Furthermore,
it has been shown that the model is robust to varying SNR
levels in the transmitted signal.
V. DISCUSSION
According to Baldini in [1] the major requirements for
fingerprinting as adopted from the biometric domain are:
1) universality, meaning that every device must be iden-
tifiable by the characteristics of its built-in electrical
components.
2) uniqueness, meaning that no two devices should have
the same fingerprint signatures or physical characteris-
tics.
3) permanence, which requires that the features must be
invariant to time and environmental conditions.
4) collectability, which requires that the characteristics
must me quantitatively measurable
All requirements may not be satisfied simultaneously or to
the same extent for all components in an IoT device. Further-
more, in current state-of-the-art identification approaches, the
features may be time varying, dependent on the environment,
or in some cases may not be adequately discriminatory for
the identification of the device [1]. Some methods adopt
a statistical approach to feature extraction, others methods
formulate RF fingerprinting as a classification problem and
apply supervised machine and deep learning techniques on the
statistical features. There are methods that propose automatic
feature extraction from the raw RF signals using deep learning
and others adopt unsupervised learning methods.
In [15] the authors apply a statistical approach called “Radio
Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)” for passive
interrogation of microwave devices. The RF-DNA is a novel
method developed by the Air Force institute of Technology in
2006. RF-DNA extracts the variance, skewness and kurtosis
features from three statistical properties of the signal namely:
the instantaneous amplitude, phase and frequency of the re-
ceived signal. The statistical features are then concatenated to
form the fingerprint or “DNA”. Multiple discriminant analysis
(MDA) and a maximum likelihood classifier (MLC) were
applied for dimension reduction and classification respectively.
The authors also applied non-parametric random forest and
Adaboost classifiers using RF-DNaA features in [16] and
obtained better results than the MLC. Extending this work,
Bihl et. al [17] applied multiple-discriminant analysis to reduce
TABLE I: Statistic and P-value for raw data from RF Devices.
RF Device
Device of interest Device 0 Device 1 Device 2 Device 3 Device 4 Device 5
Device 0 (0.00, 1.00) (0.02, 0.00) (0.05, 0.00) (0.03, 0.00) (0.04, 0.00) (0.05, 0.00)
Device 1 (0.02, 0.00) (0.00, 1.00) (0.06, 0.00) (0.03, 0.00) (0.05, 0.00) (0.04, 0.00)
Device 2 (0.05, 0.00) (0.06, 0.00) (0.00, 1.00) (0.06, 0.00) (0.13, 0.00) (0.08, 0.00)
Device 3 (0.03, 0.00) (0.03,0.00) (0.06, 0.00) (0.00, 1.00) (0.06, 0.00) (0.04,0.00)
Device 4 (0.04, 0.00) (0.05,0.00) (0.13, 0.00) (0.06, 0.00) (0.00, 1.00) (0.08, 0.00)
Device 5 (0.05, 0.00) (0.04, 0.00) (0.08, 0.00) (0.04, 0.00) (0.08, 0.00) (0.00, 1.00)
TABLE II: Statistic and P-value for CAE model for all RF devices.
RF Device
Device of Interest Device 0 Device 1 Device 2 Device 3 Device 4 Device 5
Device 0 (0.000, 1.000) (0.313, 0.000) (0.636, 0.000) (0.555, 0.000) (0.771, 0.000) (0.627, 0.000)
Device 1 (0.312, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.710, 0.000) (0.334, 0.000) (0.651, 0.000) (0.380, 0.000)
Device 2 (0.635, 0.000) (0.685, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.801, 0.000) (0.198, 0.000) (0.801, 0.000)
Device 3 (0.552, 0.000) (0.331,0.000) (0.801, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.979, 0.000) (0.379,0.000)
Device 4 (0.778, 0.000) (0.653,0.000) (0.236, 0.000) (0.972, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (1.000, 0.000)
Device 5 (0.647, 0.000) (0.381, 0.00) (0.801, 0.000) (0.384, 0.000) (1.000, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000)
TABLE III: Statistic and P-value for convolutional autoencoder model for all RF devices at different SNR levels (Device of
interest: 5).
RF Device
Noise level Device 0 Device 1 Device 2 Device 3 Device 4 Device 5
0 dB (1.000, 0.000) (0.999, 0.000) (1.000, 0.000) (1.000, 0.000) (1.000, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000)
-1 dB (1.000, 0.000) (0.857, 0.000) (1.000, 0.000) (1.000, 0.00) (1.000, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000)
-5 dB (0.424, 0.000) (0.274, 0.000) (1.000, 0.000) (0.589, 0.000) (1.000, 0.00) (0.000, 1.000)
-10 dB (0.452, 0.000) (0.879,0.000) (1.000, 0.000) (0.497, 0.000) (0.993, 0.00) (0.000, 1.00)
-15 dB (0.886, 0.000) (0.932,0.000) (0.214, 0.000) (0.657, 0.000) (0.999, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000)
[0,-1,-5,-10,-15]dB (0.652, 0.000) (0.395, 0.00) (0.820, 0.000) (0.445, 0.00) (0.999, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000)
TABLE IV: Statistic and P-value for convolutional autoencoder model for all USRP RF devices at different SNR levels (Device
of interest: 2).
RF Device
Noise level Device 0 Device 1 Device 2 Device 3 Device 4
-10 dB (0.652, 0.000) (0.557, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.580, 0.000) (0.515, 0.000)
-8 dB (0.607, 0.000) (0.417, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.475, 0.000) (0.435, 0.000)
-6 dB (0.447, 0.000) (0.302, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.290, 0.000) (0.295, 0.000)
-4 dB (0.508, 0.000) (0.340, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.337, 0.000) (0.243, 0.00)
-2 dB (0.800, 0.000) (0.700, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.680, 0.000) (0.701, 0.000)
0dB (0.587, 0.000) (0.366, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.408, 0.000) (0.209, 0.000)
2 dB (0.680, 0.000) (0.605, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.650, 0.000) (0.424, 0.000)
4 dB (0.615, 0.000) (0.534, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.512, 0.000) (0.482, 0.000)
6 dB (0.525, 0.000) (0.535, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.520, 0.000) (0.525, 0.000)
8 dB (0.487, 0.000) (0.512, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.489, 0.000) (0.457, 0.000)
10dB (0.373, 0.000) (0.499, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.467, 0.000) (0.462, 0.000)
[-10,10]dB (0.319, 0.000) (0.356, 0.000) (0.000, 1.000) (0.339, 0.000) (0.411, 0.000)
the dimensions of the RF-DNA and showed that better results
could be obtained. The authors in [18] adopt the same RF-
DNA method to address physical layer security for cognitive
radio networks.
The authors in [19] employed a symbol-based statistical RF
fingerprinting approach for identification of fake base station
(FBS) in a cellular network. In their work, leverage is made
on the fact that the amplitude and phase errors introduced
in the transmitted signal will be larger for a FBS compared
to a real base station (RBS). The non-linearity introduced by
the power amplifier of several software defined radio in the
FBS is measured at the user equipment using a second-order
symbol-based error vector magnitude (EVM) approach. After
this, the structure of the noise in the signal the UE receives
is determined using the kurtosis; specifically the second and
fourth order moments. The authors assert that the kurtosis on
the magnitude of the noise structure is an effective indicator
that can be used to identify a FBS.
Patel in [20] proposed the use of non-parametric methods
for feature generation such as mean, median, mode and
trend rather parametric methods such as variance, standard
deviation, skewness and kurtosis. By testing this using a
random forest classifier, he asserts that features obtained
from non-parametric features result in improved classification.
In [21] the authors tackle the problem of identifying a node
by its fingerprint. In their work they use features extracted
from the complex amplitude and phase angle of the WiFi
signals. Hilbert transform is applied as data prepossessing.
They however discard the phase profiles and use the amplitude
profiles for feature extraction. Principal component analysis
(PCA) was used to reduce the dimension and the reduced data
is fed into a neural network for classification.
There are many other works that follow the approach of
statistically generating RF fingerprints and feeding them into
a classification model such as [22] [23] [24]. Similar to this
work some work such as [25] actually perform classification
on the raw RF data. These works do not consider that training
data of some classes are unavailable. Moreover, in most of the
works, the proposed approaches are tested on data obtained at
singular noise levels, which does not always depict real life
scenario.
An anomaly detection technique based on a deep predictive
coding neural network, for analyzing RF spectrum in wireless
systems was proposed in [26]. In their work, frequency-domain
data obtained from time-domain data were stored as sequential
2D images. The image sequences were then fed into a deep
learning video predictor which attempts to predict the next
frame from previous frames. Anomaly detection is triggered
when there is a deviation between the actual and predicted
spectrum behavior. In [27], an anomaly identification method
in temporal-spectral data was proposed. They generate models
from historical data and compare the historical data with real-
time data for intrusion detection. These approaches do not
require RF data from all classes. However, there is a challenge
of specifying what normal system behavior means, as well as
defining an appropriate threshold.
There have been recent works that have applied generative
models. The very recent work by Roy et.al in [28] proposes
the use of GANs for the detection of rogue RF transmitters.
They use the generator model of the GAN to learn the sample
space of the IQ values of the authorized transmitters. They
then generate fake signals that mimic the transmissions of
the authorized transmitters from the learned representation.
The authors test their model with fake data generated by
the model, as opposed to actual data from an unauthorized
device. Furthermore, data was collected at one SNR level of
45dB which infers very strong signal. Also, more recently
the authors in [29] introduced a method called spectrum
anomaly detector with interpretable features (SAIFE) which is
an anomaly detection framework for wireless spectrum based
on adversarial autoencoders. In their work, the authors make
use of power spectral density (PSD) data. They showed that
their model can achieve a constant false alarm rate in an
unsupervised setting, whereas in a semi supervised setting,
the model is capable of learning intuitive features such as
class center frequency and signal bandwidth. Their approach
achieves very impressive results while being exposed to just
20% of labeled data samples.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the existing methods
in the literature do not consider the unavailability of data from
some classes (e.g., intruder) during training. For the more
recent works that use generative models and consider iden-
tifying novel classes, the models are trained and tested with
data of only one SNR level which may not be representative
of certain real life scenarios. Furthermore, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that combines deep learning
with information theoretic approach to authentication in the
RF domain. Our approach has been verified on data which
contains different SNR levels to represent the real life effects
of varying channel conditions, device mobility and noise.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we propose a novel framework for intrusion
detection based on RF fingerprinting using deep learning.
Specifically, the problem of identifying an authorized device
or an intruder from a set of devices of the same make,
model and manufacturer sending the exact same information
is considered, and a novel concept of Device Authentication
Code (DAC) is proposed. In the proposed framework, an
autoencoder is used to automatically extract features from the
RF traces, and the reconstruction error is used as the DAC,
and this DAC is unique to each device and the particular
message of interest. Then Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test
is used to match the distribution of the reconstruction error
generated by the autoencoder and the received message, and
the result will determine whether the device of interest be-
longs to an authorized user. We validate this concept on two
experimentally collected RF traces from six ZigBee and five
universal software defined radio peripheral (USRP) devices,
respectively. Experimental results demonstrate that DAC is
able to prevent device impersonation by extracting salient
features that are unique to any wireless device of interest and
can be used to identify RF devices. Furthermore, we show
that our method is robust to changes in channel conditions,
mobility and varying signal strength. It is worth noting that the
proposed method does not need the RF traces of the intruder
during model training yet be able to identify devices not seen
during training, which makes it practical.
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